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5 Abstract—Modern cloud computing platforms based on virtual machine monitors (VMMs) host a variety of complex businesses which
6 present many network security vulnerabilities. In order to protect network security for these businesses in cloud computing, nowadays,
7 a number of middleboxes are deployed at front-end of cloud computing or parts of middleboxes are deployed in cloud computing.
8 However, the former is leading to high cost and management complexity, and also lacking of network security protection between
9 virtual machines while the latter does not effectively prevent network attacks from external traffic. To address the above-mentioned
10 challenges, we introduce a novel customized network security for cloud service (CNS), which not only prevents attacks from external
11 and internal traffic to ensure network security of services in cloud computing, but also affords customized network security service for
12 cloud users. CNS is implemented by modifying the Xen hypervisor and proved by various experiments which showing the proposed
13 solution can be directly applied to the extensive practical promotion in cloud computing.
14 Index Terms—Network security, FDCs, unified management, customized network security service, packet delay, throughput
Ç
15 1 INTRODUCTION
16 CLOUD computing has emerged as one of the most influ-17 ential paradigms in the IT industry, and has attracted
18 extensive attention from both academia and industry.
19 Reduced costs and capital expenditures, increased opera-
20 tional efficiencies, scalability, and flexibility are regarded as
21 benefits of cloud computing. Although the great benefits
22 brought by cloud computing paradigm are exciting for IT
23 companies, academic researchers and potential cloud users,
24 security problems of cloud computing become serious
25 obstacles which, without being appropriately addressed,
26 will limit extensive applications and utilization of cloud
27 computing in the future. In cloud computing, network secu-
28 rity [8], [9], [17], [46], [53] is believed to be one of the promi-
29 nent security concerns, and it poses the same deadly threat
30 as data security and privacy disclosure. Furthermore, as
31 stated by National Vulnerability Database [29], there are 84
32 network vulnerabilities discovered in cloud computing by
33 February 2013, all of which strongly threaten network secu-
34 rity of cloud computing. In addition, there is sufficient
35evidence [27] that a large number of data destruction or
36tampering or forgery in cloud computing still come from
37malicious network attacks.
38In recent years, there have been a number of relative
39efforts [1], [18], [22], [28], [47], [48], [52] in probing into data
40security and privacy in cloud computing, and tremendous
41progress has been maintained. However, these outcomes
42are based on an assumption that there has been secure net-
43work of cloud computing, and if the assumption is got rid
44of, the above achievements would come to be naught. Fur-
45ther, some researchers pay much attention to certain types
46of network security in cloud computing. For example, Lin
47et al. [19] have placed network inspection detection system
48into a privileged virtual machine (VM) to verify all packets
49received by the cloud platform. However, this approach has
50an unavoidable drawback: the privileged VM causes serious
51performance bottlenecks. Wu et al. [50] focus on the security
52of virtual network in virtualized environment and solve net-
53work security between VMs by Firewall. However, it is
54powerless for attacks from malicious external traffic. McA-
55fee Security-as-a-Service [34] merely focuses on Email and
56Web protection in cloud computing, Imperva Cloud [41]
57and Du et al. [5] provide Distributed Denial-of-Service
58(DDoS) protection service, and Krishnan et al. [14] attach
59importance to intrusion detection system in cloud comput-
60ing. Huawe security products [30] also only provides a sin-
61gle type of network security service for cloud computing.
62The preceding solutions are provided for a single type of
63service protection or detection in cloud computing (e.g.,
64Web or E-mail), and they are lacking of integrated compre-
65hensive protection for multi-service cloud.
66Since cloud computing hosts multi-type network-based
67service which requires a desired sequence of multiple mid-
68dleboxes together to protect their network security. For
69example, Web service needs Firewall and Web Application
70Firewall chains (FW-WAF) to protect network security.
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71 Thus, single network security service is unable to meet net-
72 work security requirements for cloud computing. Consider-
73 ing the above shortcomings of single network security
74 service, both industries and academies put many efforts on
75 alternative solutions. In industry, traditional architecture
76 [40] [10], [42] from Fig. 1a is regarded as current prevalent
77 solution for multi-type service cloud, requiring large-scale
78 security middleboxes, which leads to high costs [42], high
79 complexity, and serious performance overhead. Besides, the
80 architecture does not effectively prevent attacks between
81 VMs [33], [48]. In academia, recent efforts [6], [13], [24] and
82 [35] well combine middleboxes with SDN to protect enter-
83 prise network security and provide a flexible scalability and
84 resource optimization for middleboxes. However, they lack
85 of automatic security rules configuration and unified log
86 management for middleboxes, and cannot provide appro-
87 priate cloud security.
88 Since above-mentioned efforts is inappropriate or defec-
89 tive to protect network security of cloud computing, the
90 CNS system is presented that which adopts novel approach
91 to eliminate or mitigate the disadvantages with promising
92 benefits for cloud computing—reduced expenditure for
93 infrastructure, personnel and management, pay-by-use, etc.
94 As shown in Fig. 1b, the scheme is put forward in which
95 security middleboxes are placed in cloud computing instead
96 of at front-end of cloud computing so as to prevent mali-
97 cious attacks from external and internal traffic. This will
98 end mutual attacks between VMs for the traditional archi-
99 tecture. For security requirements in which cloud users’ ser-
100 vice is placed in cloud computing, CNS offers customized
101 network security service to meet on-demand network secu-
102 rity service. CNS also offers automatic security rules config-
103 uration and unified log management for middleboxes so as
104 to lower complexity management and costs for cloud pro-
105 vider. Note that security capabilities or optimization algo-
106 rithm of each device or middlebox [12] is not enhanced
107 under this approach, but a more affordable and convenient
108 protection service is provided.
109 In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
110  Innovative architecture A novel flexible effiective
111 architecture for network protection of cloud comput-
112 ing is proposed. Based on best knowledge, a system-
113 atic approach to provide on-demand unified
114 solution for network security protection of cloud
115 computing is advocated.
116  Preventing attacks from external and internal traffic
117 CNS prevents network attacks not only from
118 external traffic but also attacks from internal
119traffic so as to ensure network security of cloud
120users’ service.
121 Customized network security service So long as cloud
122users understanding their service security hosted on
123cloud computing raise security requirements, CNS
124can provide network security protection for their
125service.
126 Low cost and complexity CNS provides virtual middle-
127box with automatic security rules configuration, and
128offers unified log UI for a cloud user and cloud
129administrator. By this approach, cloud providers
130pay lower price to provide cloud users with safe and
131trusted security service. Accordingly, cloud users
132also have access to low-cost service fees.
133The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
134discusses related work. Section 3 provides an overview of
135the CNS design. Section 4 gives implementation details of
136the entire system. Section 5 presents various experimental
137results for evaluating system impact and performance. The
138paper is concluded Section 6.
1392 RELATED WORK
140This section presents literature review on several research
141areas related to CNS, including cloud-based single network
142security service and cloud-based integrated security service.
143Cloud-based single security service. Focus on providing
144the security for a certain type of service, preventing
145certain types of attacks, or optimizing a certain type of
146middleboxes.
147Cloud computing + IDS: In recent years, instruction detec-
148tion system (IDS) for cloud computing has become research
149focus for numerous experts studies. For vulnerabilities of a
150cloud system and compromising virtual machines to deploy
151further large-scale DDoS, NICE [3] has proposed a multi-
152phase distributed vulnerability detection, measurement,
153and countermeasure selection mechanism, which is con-
154structed on attack graph based analytical models and
155reconfigurable virtual network-based countermeasures to
156significantly improve attack detection and mitigate attack
157consequences. Because of distributed nature, grid and cloud
158computing environments can become the targets which
159intruders look for and become possible vulnerabilities to
160exploit. Meanwhile, it requires more than user authentica-
161tion with passwords or digital certificates and confidential-
162ity in data transmission to provide the security in a
163distributed system. Vieira et al. [49] have integrated knowl-
164edge and behavior analysis to detect specific intrusions.
165Regardless of host-based IDS, network-based IDS,
Fig. 1. Architecture comparison between the traditional architecture and CNS, (a) the traditional architecture, (b) CNS architecture, requiring external
or internal traffic to traverse a desired sequence of FDs before accessing servers in service domains.





166 knowledge-based IDS, or behavior-based IDS, Modi et al.
167 [25] have surveyed different intrusions affecting availabil-
168 ity, confidentiality and integrity of cloud resources and ser-
169 vice and have recommended IDS/IPS positioning in cloud
170 environment to achieve desired security in the next genera-
171 tion networks.
172 Cloud computing + DOS: One of the most serious threats
173 to cloud computing itself comes from HTTP Denial of Ser-
174 vice or XML-Based Denial of Service attacks, Chonka et al.
175 [2] have offered a solution to trace back through our Cloud
176 TraceBack (CTB) to find attack source, and have introduced
177 the use of a back propagation neutral network, which was
178 trained to detect and filter such attack traffic.
179 The above research can only provide a single type of net-
180 work security, they could do nothing for integrated network
181 security service.
182 Cloud-based integrated network security service. provide
183 integrated service with security protection (such as enter-
184 prise, data center, cloud computing). Existing research lays
185 particular emphasis on middleboxes coupled with cloud
186 computing or SDN.
187 Cloud computing + middleboxes: Salah et al. [38] focus on
188 integrating the most popular types of middleboxes (e.g.,
189 IDSs, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), FW, etc), which
190 aims at offering an integrated set of security service for
191 cloud computing. However, this brings a huge challenge to
192 configurate security rules and manage so many middle-
193 boxes. CNS not only provides comprehensive security serv-
194 ices, but also facilitates the provision of management and
195 configuration. APLOMB, Embark [15] and Yuan et al. [51]
196 considered that current middlebox infrastructure is expen-
197 sive and complex to manage, and generates new failure
198 modes of networks, it outsources enterprise middlebox
199 processing to the cloud, solves security problems faced by
200 modern enterprises. CNS as security provider on the cloud
201 can provide APLOMB with outsourcing security services.
202 SDN + middleboxs: Cloudwatcher [43], which provides
203 monitoring service for large and dynamic cloud networks,
204 automatically detours network packets to be inspected by
205 pre-installed network security devices. Compared to CNS,
206 this work is lack of log and event unified management and
207 detailed analysis of filtering rules on the middlebox, and
208 does not solves middlebox hotspots on FDCs. CoMb [39]
209 addresses key resource management and implementation
210 challenges that arise in exploiting benefits of consolidation
211 in middlebox deployments, but this work is almost difficult
212 to achieve CoMb system due to middleboxes’ closed system
213 and incompatible architecture, and large development costs.
214 SIMPLE [35], based on a SDN-based policy enforcement
215 layer, takes an explicit stance to work within the constraints
216 of legacy middleboxes and existing SDN interfaces, ensur-
217 ing that the traffic is directed through the desired sequence
218 of middleboxes and overcoming significant manual effort
219 and operator expertise. However, this work is lack of log
220 and event unified management and detailed analysis of fil-
221 tering rules on the middlebox, and does not provide secu-
222 rity service for cloud security.
223 Cloud computing + SDN + middleboxs: Split/Merge [37]
224 can be dynamically scaled out (or in) virtual middleboxs in
225 cloud computing, and enables load-balanced elasticity: Per-
226 flow state may be transparently split between many replicas
227or merged back into one. However, this work mainly
228focuses on how to dynamically scaled out (or in) virtual
229middleboxs, and it does not provide customized network
230security service in cloud computing according to cloud
231user’s security requirements and unified management.
232The above cloud-based integrated network security ser-
233vice is lack of perfect fusion among middleboxes, cloud
234computing and SDN, neither provides customized network
235security for cloud service, nor considers maintenance costs
236and management complexity.
2373 DESIGN
238Before the CNS design is demonstrated, it is envisioned that
239hardware platform, hypervisor andVMs on cloud computing
240are trusted and what is focused is network security of service
241in cloud computing. TheCNS design dedicates three aspects:
242 Preventing malicious attacks from external and internal
243traffic: As shown in Fig. 1b, CNS prevents network
244attacks from both external traffic and internal traffic
245to ensure network security of service domains.
246Whenever accessing to service domains, external
247traffic or internal traffic needs to pass through a
248desired sequence of filer domains (FDs) (e.g., FW–
249WAF) to prevent malicious attacks (it is also called
250VMs filter domains). The specific design and imple-
251mentation are presented in x3.1 and x4.3.
252 Customized network security service: Most cloud users
253known clearly about security requirements for the
254service in service domains and prefer specific meas-
255ures according to their requirements. CNS adds cor-
256responding security rules into FDs on a sequence of
257FDs path and forwards traffic to go through this
258sequence, which ensures network security. The spe-
259cific design and implementation are presented in
260x3.2 , x4.1 and x4.3.
261 Reducing cost and complexity: It reduces device hard-
262ware cost by migrating middleboxes to VMs in cloud
263computing. Furthermore, automatic analysis about
264cloud users’ customized network security require-
265ments and unified log management from FDs lower
266management complexity and costs. This section is
267presented in x3.3, x4.1 and x4.2.
268Unlike MtoVM [7], [8] that migrates all middleboxes to
269the same VM, The CNS system migrates each middlebox to
270a separate VM. As the comparison experiment demonstrates
271in (x5.2), CNS gets much better performance than MtoVM.
272Before the design is introduced, the notation of a desired
273sequence of FDs is defined as filter domain chain.
274Definition 1 (FDC). Filter domain chain (FDC) represents a
275desired sequence of filter domains, and traffic must go through
276FDC to ensure their network security before arriving at servers
277in service domains. For example, FDC (FW ! WAF) of web
278traffic goes through Firewall and WAF.
2793.1 Component
280As shown in Fig. 1b, CNS consists of the following several
281components: a system domain (dom0), MDs, FDs, service
282domains and virtual switch (vSwitch).




of283  Dom0 We weaken dom0 privileges, it does not have
284 the permission to create/start and stop/destroy any
285 domain in FDs. However, these permissions are
286 reserved: it still has the privileges to operate every
287 domain in service domains and management
288 domains (MDs) and manage resources, including
289 scheduling time-slices and I/O quotas.
290  MDs are composed of cental security management
291 domain (CSM) and event and log management
292 domain (ELM). CSM has permission to create/start
293 and stop/destroy any domain in FDs, manage and
294 control FDs, and provide security inspection path for
295 incoming/outgoing traffic of service domains. ELM
296 stores and manages security events and logs from
297 FDs and provides audit inquiry and attack statistics
298 for cloud users and cloud administrator.
299  FDs are a real network security inspection performer
300 comprised of various virtual middleboxes. Network
301 security inspection (e.g., anti-virus, filtering), dec-
302 ryption and encryption are realized by FDs, and this
303 ensures that incoming/outgoing traffic to/from ser-
304 vice domains are secure and trusted. FDs flexibly
305 provide service domains with different security
306 inspections according to security needs of different
307network-based service (called customized network
308security service).
309 Service Domains hosts multiple types of service
310(e.g., FTP server, Web server) owned by cloud users.
311 vSwitch receives forwarding rules from MD and
312forwards external and internal traffic through FDs to
313be filtered and inspected.
314MDs and FDs cooperate jointly to provide customized net-
315work security service for cloud users, of which MDs provide
316incoming and outgoing traffic of service domains with their
317corresponding FDCs as inspection path and FDs perform
318security inspection when these traffic goes through FDCs.
319The focus of customized network security service lies in the
320fact that different service in service domains corresponds to
321different FDCs. For example, as shown in Fig. 3b, the FTP
322server corresponds to its FDCs, while Web server has corre-
323sponding FDCs in Fig. 3c. Due to different security require-
324ments, the same type of service also has different FDCs. For
325example, the encrypted Email traffic passes through its corre-
326sponding FDCs (FW–EDS–SSL/VPN), whereas the non-
327encrypted Email passes through FW–EDS.
328Fig. 1b shows that external and internal traffic must tra-
329verses their corresponding FDCs before arriving at service
330domains. When external traffic accesses the service in ser-
331vice domains, it is subjected to security inspection through
332a1, and then forwarded to service domains through a2;
333Internal traffic can not directly access service domains, and
334it must go through its corresponding FDCs (b1 and b2).
3353.2 Customized Network Security Service
336CNS provides customized network security service accord-
337ing to cloud users’ various security requirements. Cloud
338users who know clearly about security requirements of their
339services in service domains only need to fill their security
340requirements in accordance with security spec template
341provided by cloud provider, and then deliver it to CNS. All
342the rest will be accomplished by CNS which automatically
343generates corresponding FDCs and security rules according
344to users’ security spec and adds corresponding security
345rules into filter domains on FDCs path. The traffic must
346pass through FDCs to be inspected so as to ensure network
347security before arriving at cloud users’ services.
348As shown in Fig. 2, spec parser in the CSM analyzes
349users’ spec and generates FDCs in both directions (incoming
Fig. 3. Examples of customized network security service for different services.
Fig. 2. CNS design.




of350 and outgoing traffic) and corresponding security rules. These351 security rules are issued to FDs on FDCs path and incoming
352 and outgoing traffic pass through these security rules on
353 their FDCs to be filtered and inspected. For example, Web
354 server in service domains utilizes FW and WAF to protect
355 its network security. After analysis, security rules protecting
356 Web server are configurated to the FW and the WAF, and
357 FDC of its incoming traffic is FW!WAF, FDC of its outgo-
358 ing traffic is WAF ! FW due to the fact that most network
359 security middelboxs are stateful and need to process both
360 directions of a session for correctness. Refer to x5.1 for
361 detailed content and analysis of security spec.
362 There are many ways to realize the function that traffic
363 from/to service domains must go through their correspond-
364 ing FDCs, a more concise way is on based on forwarding
365 rules [23]. RouteGen in the CSM converts FDCs into for-
366 warding rules placed in vSwtich (x5.3). In order to fast find
367 forwarding rules, the vSwtich contains two forwarding
368 tables: Forward Route Table (FRT) and Backward Route
369 Table (BRT). Forwarding rules of incoming traffic is placed
370 in the FRT, forwarding rules of outgoing traffic is placed in
371 the BRT. The above Web server is considered as an example
372 of forwarding: when a client accesses the web server, the
373 vSwtich inquires forwarding rules from the FRT and Web
374 incoming traffic is first forwarded to the FW, then the WAF,
375 finally arrives at the web server; outgoing traffic is for-
376 warded oppositely. In the following, a few examples of cus-
377 tomized network security services are enumerated.
378 Example. It is assumed that a cloud user inquires cloud
379 provider to provide network security of both network-layer
380 (e.g., data link layer, network layer) and application-layer
381 (e.g., website) for Web server in service domains. The CSM
382 analyzes users’ security requirements in conjunction with
383 FDs topology: FW is used to protect network-layer security
384 so as to avoid DDOS attack, UDP and ICMP flood, etc, and
385 the WAF is used to protect application-layer security so as
386 to avoid SQL injection, cross-site scripting attacks, etc.
387 Therefore, an ordered combination of the FW and the WAF
388 is adapted to protect network security of Web server
389 required by cloud user. The specific FDCs are shown in
390 Fig. 3c. Table 1 envisages the situation in which cloud users
391 raise security requirements for various servers suffering
392from network attacks and CNS provides corresponding sol-
393utions shown in Fig. 3.
3943.3 Unified Management
395CNS provides unified management for FDs in terms of uni-
396fied configuration management and unified log manage-
397ment. In the traditional architecture, administrators have to
398face much tedious configuration management from inde-
399pendent vendors and different types of middleboxes. In
400cloud computing, if the same problem as the traditional
401architecture cannot be solved appropriately, it is almost an
402impossible task for cloud administrators to configurate and
403manage such a large diversity of FDs. As shown in Fig. 2,
404CNS can provide automated configuration and unified
405management to overcome these issues.
406Automatic configuration CSM automatically analyzes user
407security spec in conjunction with the FDs topology, and
408then generates security rules directly configured into corre-
409sponding FDs and corresponding FDCs directly delivered
410to vSwitch by the method of forwarding rules, this process
411does not require human intervention (except for post-
412adjustment for special rules).
413Unified log management ELM manages and counts all the
414logs (e.g., system logs, audit logs, attack logs) generated by
415FDs, and generates statistical reports based on attack logs.
416Logs from FDs are sent to ELM, analyzed by log analysis
417module in ELM, and placed in log database. To easily query
418logs and attack statistics, ELM provides cloud administrator
419and cloud users with GUI, and offers respective access privi-
420leges for different users shown in Table 2. Cloud administra-
421tor can access all the logs and statistics with high privileges,
422while cloud user can only access corresponding statistics and
423these logs are recordedwhen their service is under attack.
4244 IMPLEMENT
425The above design elaborates the principle of CNS and this
426section presents the implementation of CNS in detail. First,
427CNS automatically analyzes customized security require-
428ment spec required by cloud users, thereby generating corre-
429sponding security rules and FDCs. Second, unified logs
430management proves to be conducive to facilitating event and
431log query for cloud administrator and cloud user. Finally,
432the FDCs implement is presented by forwarding rules.
4334.1 Customized Network Security Service
434Implementation
435According to cloud users security requirements, CNS gener-
436ates the corresponding security rules and forwarding rules
437to ensure services’ network security. Section 3.2 shows the
TABLE 1
Corresponding Customized Network Security Service for


































Actors and Operations in the Privilege Model
Log type Cloud Administrator Cloud User
System logs @
Audit logs @
Attack logs @ own services @
Statistical reports @ own services @
Each @ in the table denotes that the actor can perform the corresponding
operation.




of438 principle design of customization of network security serv-439 ices, its focus is reflected in the implementation of security440 spec analysis.441 Security spec template: As shown in Fig. 4a, cloud provider
442 provides cloud users with customized security spec tem-
443 plate, in which they fill in security requirements according
444 to service requirements placed on service domains. The
445 filled security spec is transmitted after encrypted in order to
446 avoid being tampered by malicious cloud administrator
447 [16]. The following explains some items in the template and
448 presents some descriptive language for spec analysis. For
449 the sake of clarity, we list some used symbols in Table 3.
450 IP and port: They represent protected object. IP and port
451 fields in the basic information can be filled with one or more
452 IP and port pairs, that is, one or more protected servers.
453 Algorithm 1. Spec Analysis Algorithm
454 1: // Initialize corresponding security rules and FDC of
455 each service.
456 2: for each Si 2 S do
457 3: Ri f
458 4: Sði;fdcÞ  f
459 5: end for
460 6: R f
461 7: for each Si 2 S do
462 8: // Analyze the protected Si requiring security rules
463 and FDC.
464 9: for eachmj 2M do
465 10: // Add a security rule to the corresponding middelbox.
466 11: while each rk is yes do
467 12: Rmj  Rðk;mjÞ \ Rmj
468 13: end while
469 14: // Security rules protected by Si.
470 15: Ri Rmj \ Ri
471 16: // Add the needed middlebox to FDC.
472 17: if inspection item in base information is yes then
473 18: Sði;fdcÞ  Sði;fdcÞ \mj
474 19: end if
475 20: end for
476 21: R Ri \ R
477 22: end for
478 Network-layer, Anti-Virus, Anti-Spam, Web inspection and
479 Secure transmission: These items in the base information are
480important parameters to determine which virtual middle-
481boxes to provide protection for S security requirements, and
482each item has a corresponding virtual middlebox. For exam-
483ple, RFW and RWAF are respectively expressed as FW secu-
484rity rules and WAF security rules to protect Website server
485Sweb, that is, Sweb needs security rules Rweb = {RFW , RWAF } to
486protect its network security.
487Network-layer and Web security: They are the refinement of
488network-layer and Web inspection items in the basic infor-
489mation. Specifically, network-layer protection includes
490DDOS and flood attack etc. If any item in network-layer
491security is activated, Rði;FWÞ is used to express it, RFW =
492{Rð1;FWÞ; Rð2;FWÞ   Rðn;FWÞ} indicates that FW consists of
493multiple rules Rði;FW Þ. Similarly, RWAF = {Rð1;WAF Þ, Rð2;WAF Þ
494. . .Rðn;WAF Þ}.
495CSM accepts filled and encrypted spec from a cloud user.
496Spec parser in CSM first decrypts the security spec, analyzes
497it, and then generates FDCs of traffics in both direction and
498security rules for the protected service domains. We show
499the pseudocode about the spec analysis in algorithm 1. First,
500security rules and FDCs of the protected objects are initial-
501ized. That is, corresponding security rules of all the pro-
502tected servers are set as Ri = {f} and R = {f} from 2 lines to 6
503lines, and corresponding FDCs of Si is set as NULL, i.e.,
504Sði;fdcÞ = {f}. Second, security rule Rðk;mjÞ is configured to
505corresponding virtual middlebox mj to protect Si according
Fig. 4. (a) Cloud provider provides cloud users with customized security spec template in which cloud users fill in security requirements according to
service security requirements. (b) CNS analyzes Web security spec from cloud users and generates filter domain chains of traffics in both direction
and security rules.
TABLE 3
Spec Analysis Algorithm Needs the Symbol and its Explanation
Symbol Repression
S The set of servers filled in security spec;
Si A server that is a specific IP and port pair;
R
A collection of security rules to protect S,
Multiple Ri protect S by R, R ¼ fRiji 2 1 . . .ng;
Ri
A collection of security rules to protect Si,
and it may be dispersed in one or more
virtual middleboxes on its corresponding FDCs path;
M The set of virtual middleboxes;
mj Any one of M;
Rmj Security rules whichmj contains to protect Si;
Rðk;mjÞ
Security rule configured to the corresponding
virtual middleboxmj to protect Si;
Sði;fdcÞ Corresponding FDCs of Si;





506 to ’yes’ items in spec (lines 11-13). The same operation is
507 performed for all the involved virtual middleboxes (lines 9-
508 20). Third, these corresponding virtual middleboxes which
509 provide Si with network security are added into FDCs to
510 protect Si (lines 17-19). Finally, Ri is composed of security
511 rules provided by one or more virtual middleboxes to pro-
512 tect Si (lines 7-22).
513 Web example: Fig. 4b presents Web security spec provided
514 by a cloud user and specific content generated by analysis.
515 The left side in Fig. 4b shows that Web security spec enables
516 two items in base information: network-layer and Web
517 inspection. That is, Web server needs network-layer and
518 Web application-layer security protection. It is obvious that
519 a combination of FW and WAF meets security requirements
520 of web server: First, corresponding FDCs of Web server are
521 SðWeb;fdcÞ: FW ! WAF and WAF ! FW; Second, RWeb =
522 {RFW , RWAF } is configured to protect SWeb on FDCs path. All
523 items in network-layer security detail Web network-layer
524 security requirements, and Rð2;FWÞ and Rð3;FWÞ represent
525 specific security rules. Similarly, all the items from Web
526 security clarify application-layer ones and specific analytical
527 results present Rð2;WAF Þ, Rð3;WAF Þ etc.
528 4.2 Log Unified Management
529 Log unified management is also perceived as the CNS
530 research emphasis. If each FDs has its own management
531 user interface (UI) as what traditional way does, it is impos-
532 sible for cloud computing administrators to log in so many
533 UIs to view attack logs and statistics information due to
534 massive and tedious work.
535 Furthermore, most of the servers in service domains may
536 require multiple FDs to protect them, inspected attack logs
537 scattering in multiple FDs do not form integral statistics and
538 management, therefore, it is essential for log unified
539 management.
540 Algorithm 2. Log Classification Algorithm
541 1: // Classify every log.
542 2: if every log l then
543 3: // l is a system log.
544 4: switch (l:logtype)
545 5: case system log:
546 6: Lca Lca \ l
547 7: // l log belongmi logs.
548 8: if L:fdid = (mi 2M) then
549 9: Lmi  Lmi \ l
550 10: end if
551 11: break
552 12: // l is a attack or statistic log.
553 13: case attack log and statistic log:
554 14: Lca Lca \ l
555 15: // l log belong cui user.
556 16: if l:serverID = (cui 2 CU) then
557 17: Lcui  Lcui \ l




562For events, logs and system information from FDs, ELM
563performs unified management to provide cloud computing
564administrators with convenient management and query. In
565order to easily identify and standardize all logs from FDs,
566FDs need to abide by a unified log format shown in Fig. 5.
567LogType indicates log type (e.g., attack log, system log);
568FDID is denoted as unique FD identifier; EventID is denoted
569as event identifier (e.g., attack number); ServerID indicates
570certain domain in service domains as unique identifier to
571facilitate server log information statistics; SrcIP, SrcPort, Des-
572tIP, DestPort, Protocol represent quintuple flow; Description
573represents detailed information of the event.
574After ELM receives logs, these logs are classified by log
575parser in order to provide access on the basis of actor per-
576missions in Table 2. Parameters in Table 4 are introduced to
577facilitate the description of log classification algorithm.
578Algorithm 2 offers log classification. A log l arrives at ELM,
579If l is a system log, l is added into Lca (lines 6); If l belongs to
580a log of mi, l is added into the corresponding Lmi (lines 8-
58110); If l is an attack log, l is added into Lca (lines 14); if l is
582generated due to the attacked server owned by the ith cloud
583user to be attacked, l is added into Lcui (lines 16-18). After
584classification, cloud administrator queries all the logs from
585FDs, cloud users only query their owner logs generated by
586corresponding middleboxes when their owner servers are
587being attacked.
5884.3 FDCs Load Balancing Implementation
589We have considered load balancing of each middlebox in
590FDCs, and avoid each middlebox becoming a hospot.
591FDCs is important part to realize customized network
592security service for each service in service domains. Route-
593Gen converts FDCs and the FDs topology into forwarding
594rules and issues these rules to the vSwitch. CSM is consid-
595ered as a SDN controller, and vSwitch is responsible for
596forwarding packets to/from FDs and service domains
597according to forwarding rules delivered by CSM. That is,
598network security inspection is achieved on the basis of for-
599warding rules in the vSwitch.
600Traffic accessing to a server in service domains is divided
601into two types of traffic: external traffic from Internet and
602internal traffic between service domains in cloud comput-
603ing. Incompetence internal or external traffic must go
604through corresponding FDCs to ensure nework security of
Fig. 5. Log format.
TABLE 4




CU All the cloud users;
Lca Log and statistics database queried by cloud
administrator;
cui The ith cloud user;
Lcui Log and statistics database only queried by the
ith cloud user;
Lmi Log and statistics database from the ith virtual
middlebox;





605 service domains. By default, forwarding rules from external
606 traffic have been stored in two route tables (FRT and BRT),
607 while there is no forwarding rules from internal traffic in
608 the mentioned route tables. The main reason goes that there
609 is very little communication between service domains. If
610 forwarding rules are added into route tables, it will result in
611 larger route table and take longer time to look up corre-
612 sponding forwarding rules from the route table, which
613 would lead to performance degradation. If the communica-
614 tion is established between service domains, the default
615 route in the vSwitch forwards the first packet between them
616 to CSM. RouteGen in the CSM generates forwarding rules
617 by FDCs of the accessed server and issues these rules to
618 vSwich, and subsequent traffic is forwarded in accordance
619 with forwarding rules in the vSwitch.
620 During FDCs generation process, we have to consider
621 two natural requirements: (1) Each chain FDC should have
622 enough virtual middelboxes assigned to it, so that we retain
623 sufficient freedom to achieve near-optimal load balancing
624 subsequently. (2) We ensure that we have sufficient degrees
625 of freedom; e.g., each FDC will have a guaranteed minimum
626 number of distinct physical sequences and that no middle-
627 box becomes a hotspot.






Pc;mj ¼ 1 (2)632
633
8j : Loadmj ¼
X
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639





8j : MaxMiddleboxOccurs MiddleboxUsedmj (6)644
645
646 Thus, we can consider the management problem in terms
647 of deciding the fraction of traffic belonging to each chain c (c
648  FDCs) that each virtual middleboxes mj has to process.
649 Let Pc;mj denote this fraction and let Tc denote the volume
650 of traffic for each chain c. The optimization problem can be
651 expressed by the linear program shown in Eqs. (1)–(6).
652 Eq. (2) simply specifies a coverage constraint so that the
653 fractional responsibilities across the virtual middleboxes on
654 the path for each c add up to 1. Eq. (3) models the stress or
655 load on each virtual middlebox in terms of the aggregate
656 processing costs (i.e., product of the traffic volume and the
657 footprints) assigned to this virtual middlebox. Here,
658mj 2 PathFDCs denotes that virtual middlebox mj is on the
659routing path for the traffic in Tc. At the same time, we want
660to make sure that no virtual middlebox becomes a hotspot;
661i.e., many chains FDCs rely on a specific virtual middlebox.
662Thus, we model the number of chosen sequences in which a
663middlebox occurs and also the maximum occurrences
664across all middleboxes in Eqs. (5) and (6) respectively. Our
665objective is to minimize the value of MaxMiddleboxOccurs
666to avoid hotspots.
667To summarize, CNS presents three important character-
668istics: 1) preventing malicious attacks from external and internal
669traffic: CNS prevents network attacks from external and
670internal traffic to ensure network security of service
671domains 2) Customized network security service: After cloud
672users put forwards security requirements according to their
673own server characteristics, CNS can be well adapted to
674meet security service requirements. 3) Complexity and cost:
675CNS can realize automatic configuration and management
676in accordance with cloud users’ security spec without
677human intervention, which includes security rules configu-
678ration and FDCs and forwarding rules generation, and pro-
679vide cloud administrators with unified logs management.
680Besides, CNS can provide cloud user with low-cost security
681service with respect to hardware and management costs of
682middleboxes.
6835 EVALUATION
684In this section, there are four goals of the evaluation:
685 valuate system benchmarks of CNS.
686 evaluate the cost of CNS and the traditional
687architecture.
688 evaluate maintenance and management complexity
689between CNS and the traditional architecture.
690 evaluate performance between CNS and MtoVM,
691between CNS-unbind-core and CNS-bind-core and
692between with and without CNS.
693Experimental environment Cloud platform is conducted on
694a Dell Server with 8 core, 3.42 GHz Intel CPU, 16GBmemory.
695IXIA [31] and iperf are considered as a performance test
696instruments. The XEN hypervisor version is 3.4.2, and the
697dom0 system is fedora 16 with kernel version 2.6.31. We
698used a 64bit fedora Linux with kernel version 2.6.27 as our
699guest OS, and the vSwitch bandwidth is 1 Gigabit Ethernet;
700CNS uses open source security softwares shown in Table 5.
701For the next step, four simulation environments are installed.
702 MtoVM simulation environment: Four kinds of open
703softwares in Table 5 are moved to the same VM.
704 CNS-unbind-core simulation environment: Each soft-
705ware is moved to a separate VM in FDs.
706 CNS-bind-core simulation environment: Each software
707is moved to a separate VM in FDs, and each VM is
708bound to a core, namely, each virtual middlebox
709runs on a separate core.
710 Without security protection.
7115.1 System Benchmarks
712We focus on four key metrics here: the time to analyze
713spec, the time to install filter rules, the time to install for-
714warding rules, the total communication overhead at the
TABLE 5
The List of Open Source Security Softwares









of715 controller, and the maximum load on any middlebox or716 link in the network relative to the optimal solution. We717 begin by running the topology from Fig. 2 on the Emulab
718 testbed. We did the comparison experiments according to
719 the middleboxes number of FDCs, whose results shown
720 are shown in Table 6.
721 Time to analyze spec. Table 6 shows the time taken by CNS
722 to proactively analyze spce according to the middleboxes
723 number from 1 to 10 of FDCs. The time to analyze increases
724 from 3.1 ms to 3.9 ms as middlebox number in FDCs
725 increases, but the increase is acceptable without large fluctu-
726 ations. The main causes here is that the controller spends
727 more time to analyzes more items in spec as middleboxes
728 number of FDCs increases.
729 Time to install filter rules. Table 6 shows the time taken by
730 CNS to install the filter rules for the FDCs. The time to install
731 changes from 5.1 ms to 32.0 ms as the middlebox number of
732 FDCs. The main bottleneck here is the controller spends mort
733 time to install more filter rules and send more filter rules to
734 eachmiddlebox in FDC.We can reduce this to 70 percent over-
735 all withmultiple parallel sending filter rules tomiddlebox.
736 Time to install forwarding rules. The time to install for-
737 warding rules is very short and almost does not change as
738 as the middlebox number of FDCs. The main causes here is
739 that it takes short time for the controller to analyze forward-
740 ing rules and sends forwarding rules only to vSwtich.
741 Controllers communication overhead. The table also shows
742 the controllers communication overhead in terms of
743 Kilobytes of control traffic to/from the controller to install
744 filter and forwarding rules. Note that there is no other
745 control traffic during normal operation. These numbers
746are consistent with the total number of rules that we need
747to install.
7485.2 Cost and Complexity
749Cost. Since middleboxes (labeled as device-based) and FDs
750(labeled as domain-based) from independent vendors and
751different types of security devices or software have distinc-
752tive costs, only rough estimation rather than accurate
753assessment is conducted. Thus, thus the average cost of all
754the middleboxes and FDs are considered as their cost.
755Device-based and domain-based cost can be drawn accord-
756ing to benchmark cost [38], [42]. It can be seen from
757Fig. 6a that device-based cost is five times as that of
758domain-based. That is, the average cost of a middlebox is
759about $5,000, while the average cost of an FD is only $1,000.
760This saves the cost to a deep extent.
761Complexity. Complexity focuses on configuration, main-
762tenance and management. CNS provides security spec
763with automatic analysis without human intervention
764(except for strategy adjustment) so as to avoid security
765rules configuration complexity. This is especially useful
766for complex network security service which requires mul-
767tiple middleboxes to meet full security protection, Com-
768plex network security service is a much difficult task
769which takes a lot of time, taking manual configuration
770and interactions between rules into consideration. In view
771of post-maintenance and post-management, the tradi-
772tional architecture (labeled as device-based) is facing the
773complex and tedious work. For example, APLOMB [42]
774has conducted a survey of 57 enterprise network adminis-
775trators and it is found that managing many heterogeneous
776middleboxes require broad expertise and consequently a
777large management team. Even small networks with only
778tens of middleboxes typically require a management team
779of 6-25 personnel. Unlike the traditional architecture, CNS
780proposes and implements automatic generation of secu-
781rity rules and FDCs and forwarding rules, and offers uni-
782fied logs management and query. Fig. 6b presents the
783comparative data of management personnel between CNS
784and the traditional architecture in the light of the com-
785plexity: For CNS, only a few personnel are required to
786maintain and manage FDs, while the traditional architec-
787ture needs a management and maintenance team with
788large-scale personnel who rapidly grows as the number of
789applications increases. Especially, when the number of
790middleboxes reaches 100, the traditional architecture
791requires 50 personnel, whereas CNS only require 4
792personnel.
TABLE 6


















1 3.1 5.1 1.1 6
2 3.2 6.3 1.2 10
3 3.2 7.6 1.2 14
4 3.3 8.5 1.3 22
5 3.5 10.1 1.3 30
6 3.5 14.8 1.5 38
7 3.6 18.9 1.6 47
8 3.8 23.3 1.6 67
9 3.8 25.7 1.7 89
10 3.9 32.0 1.9 108
Fig. 6. Cost and complexity comparison and between CNS and the tradition architecture.





793 5.3 Performance Discussion
794 In this section, the CNS performance is evaluated with the
795 following goals:
796  Why is CNS employed rather than MtoVM? The two
797 are compared to prove the conclusion, and the rea-
798 sons are analyzed.
799  How to improve the CNS performance? What shall
800 be done to overcome the difficulties?
801  Performance overhead with CNS is evaluated to
802 determine whether the overhead is acceptable.
803 Evaluation purposes are achieved by three sets of com-
804 parative experiments.
805  The first experiment is that NCSS-unbind-core has
806 been compared with MtoVM in term of system per-
807 formance, and a better solution from comparison
808 results can be selected , and the reasons which affect
809 system performance are analyzed.
810  The second experiment, some factors affecting CNS
811 performance are overcome, and optimization results
812 from the comparison between NCSS-unbind-core
813 and CNS-bind-core is viewed.
814  The third experiment, CNS performance overhead is
815 evaluated, and related measurements on both the
816 case with CNS-bind-core and the case without CNS-
817 bind-core in cloud computing are performed, and
818 whether the overhead is within acceptable range is
819 assessed.
820 In order to response the comprehensive performance,
821 every experiment presents nine sets of comparative data
822 from three aspects of performance: latency, throughput,
823 and packet loss rate witch are important indicator [21] of
824 system performance about network security. The following
825 present the three experiments.
826The Comparison between MtoVM and CNS-unbind-core This
827is the first experiment to compare MtoVM with CNS-
828unbind-core about latency, throughput and packet packet
829loss rate. Their performances are compared by three types
830of service: UDP forwarding (FW), Website (FW-WAF), and
831Email service (FW-SSL/VPN).
832In order to obtain comprehensive and correct perfor-
833mance assessment, UDP packets are employed with differ-
834ent sizes to evaluate system performance of MtoVM and
835CNS-unbind-core. Figs. 7a and 7b) presents experimental
836results about latency and throughput. In stress measure-
837ment environment, regardless of packet size from 64bit to
8381528 bit, 500 Mbit/s throughput is always kept to observe
839packet loss. The experimental result is shown in Fig. 7c. In
840short, Figs. 7a, b, and Fig. 7c indicates two points: First,
841latency and throughput of UDP forwarding increase with
842the increase of their sizes. Second, MtoVM and CNS-
843unbind-core present the same performance, and the main
844reason is that UDP packets only traverse FW on the VM
845instead of all the virtual middleboxes on the VM although
846MtoVM employs multiple virtual middleboxes from
847Table 5 on a VM. Because CNS-unbind-core employs each
848virtual middlebox on a stand-alone VM, udp packets with
849CNS-unbind-core just go through FW according to FDC of
850UDP service. Therefore, MtoVM and CNS-unbind-core
851demonstrate the same performance in term of udp
852forwarding.
853Website access [20], [45] based on TCP protocol needs
854FW and WAF to protect its network security. The experi-
855ment method is similar to the UDP forwarding except for
856http traffic and packets with larger size from 1024 bit to
85765,536 bit. Figs. 7d, e, and Fig. 7f shows our experimental
858results: First, the relationship between packet size and
859performance is similar to the UDP forwarding. Second,
860regardless of latency or throughput or packet loss rate,
Fig. 7. The performance comparison results between four cases: the traditional architecture, CNS-unbind-core, CNS-bind-core and without CNS.




of861 CNS-unbind-core is far higher than MtoVM in terms of862 performance.863 The main reason goes like the following: the advantage of864 the MtoVM is that the entire inspection and filtering of Web865 traffic are performed only on a single VM, and this avoids
866 the overhead of inter-VM communication and cache inva-
867 lidations which may arise as shared state is accessed by
868 multiple cores; compared with CNS-unbind-core, the
869 MtoVM also has its own disadvantage which cloud incur
870 overhead due to context switches and potential contention
871 over shared resources on a single VM, especially, filtering
872 rules and feature matching require a lot of CPU resources.
873 Since CNS-unbind-core employs FW and WAF respectively
874 on a stand-alone VM. Therefore, the advantages and disad-
875 vantages of CNS-unbind-core are opposite to MtoVM. A
876 conclusion is drawn from Figs. 7d, e, and Fig. 7f) that
877 resource contention and context switches extend greater
878 impact than inter-VM communication and cache invalida-
879 tions for MtoVM and CNS-unbind-core. If CNS is used on
880 multiple-core virtual platform to perform parallel inspec-
881 tion, it is possible to overcome resource contention (espe-
882 cially, CPU resource) competition, which significantly
883 improves system performance.
884 The importance of CPU resources for performance
885 impact between MtoVM and CNS-unbind-core is further
886 confirmed by e-mail encryption and decryption requiring
887 more CPU resources. As shown in Fig. 3e, e-mail needs AS
888 and SSL/VPN to protect its network security. Figs. 7g, h,
889 and Fig. 7i shows CNS-unbind-core has a better perfor-
890 mance than MtoVM in term of latency, throughput and
891 packet loss rate. Even in the worst case, latency of MtoVM
892 is twice than CNS-unbind-core at 64,000 bits.
893 In summary, regardless of UDP forwarding, Website
894 access, Email access, Fig. 7 has showed that CNS-unbind-
895 core realizes far higher system performance than that of the
896 MtoVM. The main reasons is that a large number of rules
897 and feature matching requires a lot of CPU resources which
898 extend a greater impact than the overhead of inter-VM com-
899 munication and cache invalidations for system perfor-
900 mance. Therefore, CNS-unbind-core rather than MtoVM is
901 adopted, which can achieve better system performance.
902 The Comparison between CNS-unbind-core and CNS-
903 bind-core Resource competition, especially CPU resources,
904 context switches, inter-VM communication and cache inva-
905 lidations are regarded as main factors that affect system
906performance. CNS-unbind-core takes full advantage of sys-
907tem resources, (especially, CPU resources) and overcomes
908context switches over shared resources on a single VM.
909Since inter-VM communication between FDs makes full use
910of hardware-assisted I/O virtualization techniques such as
911single root I/O Virtualization (SR-IOV) [4] and self-assisted
912devices [36], it can reduce I/O virtualization overheads and
913achieve good performance. Therefore, inter-VM communi-
914cation overhead is considered. However, multi-core sched-
915uling constantly switches between multiple VM to lead to
916corresponding cache invalidations, which causes system
917performance degradation. In order to overcome cache inva-
918lidations, each FDs is binded to a CPU core, thus overcom-
919ing the disadvantage of cache invalidations. Fig. 7 shows
920our experimental results, as can be seen from nine sets of
921data that CNS-bind-core reflects a more superior perfor-
922mance than CNS-unbind-core.
923The Comparison both With And Without CNS-bind-core in
924Cloud Computing. This is the third experiment, there are cases
925with the CNS and cases without the CNS in cloud comput-
926ing. Fig. 7 presents the experimental comparison results indi-
927cating that the case without CNS-bind-core are more efficient
928than ones with CNS-bind-core. Although the case without
929employing CNS-bind-core to protect network security
930achives higher efficiency than one with CNS, it may lead to
931incalculable losses if no protective measures are taken to pro-
932tect cloud computing security. Therefore, it is essential to
933protect network security of cloud computing so as to defend
934various attacks from the network. Even if CNS-bind-core is
935selected to protect cloud computing security, it is necessary
936to consider whether its performance overhead can be
937accepted. The following three experiments are still used to
938evaluate the performance impact with CNS-bind-core from
939three aspects: UDP forwarding, Website and Email service.
940For UDP forwarding, Figs. 7a, b, and Fig. 7c shows Net-
941SecCC gives little impact on system performance (specific
942performance overhead is shown in Table 7), compared with
943the case without NetSecCC, NetSecCC imposes 6.4 percent
944of average latency overhead (ranging from 4.4 to 9.1 percent)
945and 8.8 percent of average throughput drop (ranging from 0
946to 13.4 percent). Packet loss rate suffers from the impact of
947security inspection and filtering. It is inevitable for these per-
948formance overhead to inspect and filter UDP traffic. Since
949UDP traffic must go through FW to be inspected and filtered
950before being forwarded to the UDP server in service
951domains. During the process, traffic is required to match
952hundreds of filtering rules in FW. This will take some time
953and result in increased latency and decreased throughput.
954Compared wtih MtoVM and CNS-unbind-core, CNS-bind-
955core hasmade tremendous progress.
956ForWebsite access, The results of this experiment showed
957in Figs. 7d, e, and Fig. 7f present CNS-bind-core has related
958impact on system performance. Compared with the case
959without CNS, latency is more affected, while throughput is
960hardly affected. Table 7 further illustrates that 16.3 percent of
961average latency overhead (ranging from 12.4 to 18.9 percent),
9620.7 percent of average throughput drop (ranging from 0 to
9634.2 percent), 0.9 percent of average overhead of packet loss
964rate (ranging from 0 to 6 percent). The main reason is like
965this: Web traffic must go through FW and WAF to be
966inspected and filtered before being forwarded to theWebsite
TABLE 7
CNS Performance Overhead Comparing to no Protective
Measures in Cloud Computing
Access method Performance Max (%) Min (%) Avg (%)
UDP packet
Latency 9.1 4.2 6.4
Throughput 13.4 0 8.8
Packet loss rate 0 0 0
Web page
Latency 18.9 12.4 16.3
Throughput 4.2 0 0.7
Packet loss rate 6 0 0.9
Encrypted mail
Latency 15.7 9.2 13.1
Throughput 5.1 0 0.8
Packet loss rate 2 0 0.3





967 server in service domains. In this process, traffic is required
968 to match hundreds of filtering rules in FW and thousands of
969 signatures in WAF, which will take some time and hence
970 result in the increased latency and the decreased throughput.
971 In the case without CNS, Web traffic directly accesses to the
972 Website server to avoid inspection in terms of system over-
973 head. Therefore, compared with the cases without CNS,
974 latency becomes longer with CNS, throughput suffers from
975 the impact of latency. However, overall system performance
976 with CNS is within the acceptable range.
977 For e-mail access, the results of this experiment showed
978 Figs. 7g, h, and Fig. 7i) present encrypted emails with CNS
979 are affected. The impact of longer latency, lower throughput,
980 and bigger packet loss with CNS is mainly caused by the rea-
981 son that emails must be forwarded through AS and SSL/
982 VPN as shown in Fig. 3e. In addition, the encrypted emails
983 require encryption processing. This will take some time and
984 lead to performance degradation. Compared with the case
985 without CNS, specific data with CNS on the performance
986 overhead are shown in Table 7: the average cost of latency is
987 13.1 percent (ranging from 9.2 to 15.7 percent), the average
988 cost of throughput is 0.8 percent (ranging from 0 to 5.1 per-
989 cent), and the average cost of packet loss rate is 0.3 percent
990 (ranging from 0 to 2 percent). For security services, the pre-
991 ceding performance overhead is acceptable.
992 In summary, it is found that CNS-unbind-core is a more
993 preferred method in terms of performance by comparing both
994 MtoVM and CNS-unbind-core. On the basis of CNS-unbind-
995 core, it is further optimized to produce more efficient CNS-
996 bind-core and offer more efficient customized network secu-
997 rity service. At the same time, by the comparison of the case
998 with CNS-bind-core and the case without CNS-bind-core in
999 cloud computing, it is found that CNS-bind-core can provide
1000 adequate network security protection for cloud computing
1001 without sacrificing the high price of system performance.
1002 6 CONCLUSION
1003 Main problems caused by todays cloud security are high costs
1004 and performance overhead, and management complexity,
1005 especially the lack of customized network security services.
1006 In this paper, we introduced a innovative architecture called
1007 CNS, which provides customized network security for secu-
1008 rity needs of suitable cloud services as well as the qualitative
1009 benefits with respect to low performance overhead, easy to
1010 maintenance and management, and reduction in middle-
1011 boxes costs. Further, we gave a specific and detailed examples
1012 and algorithms in the process of implementation in order to
1013 leverage these benefits in practice. Next, we use CNS to offer
1014 customized network security service for big data, enterprise
1015 and outsourcing security through in-depth research.
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